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A cloud of permanent economic emergency hangs over the world. 
In early December 2011, as the leaders of European Union member 
states traveled to Brussels for their sixteenth emergency summit in 
two years to deal with the ongoing debt and fiscal crises of finance 
capitalism, the myriad tremors of a state of economic emergency 
continued to reverberate around the globe, from core to periphery and 
back again. In one of the centers of transnational financial trading—
the city of London—those coming together under the banner of the 
“Occupy” movement to imagine and discuss alternatives to prevailing 
(failing) economic structures are essentialized by British authorities 
and catalogued alongside al-Qaeda as a threat to national security. 
Meanwhile, in the peripheral reaches of northern Peru, indigenous 
resistance to foreign capitalist extraction of natural resources prompts 
the declaration of a state of emergency by the national government 
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and the granting of special police powers to suppress protests. This 
global snapshot is merely a single freeze-frame in an ongoing reel; 
evidence of the intersection of political economic interests and the 
emergency governance paradigm is abundant in volume, universal in 
scope.  
Recourse by states to the frames of emergency and exception has 
never been limited solely to the sphere of “national security.” It has 
been integral to economic law and policy in consolidating hegemonic 
financial interests, and has been invoked in order to salvage finance 
capitalism from the wreckage of its own crisis on more than one 
occasion. Analysis of states of emergency in international legal 
scholarship has, however, primarily revolved around the resort to 
exceptional powers in times of “political”—rather than “economic”—
crisis: military engagement, ethnic conflict, and securitization. The 
standard approach acknowledges three distinct varieties of 
emergency—grave political crises, economic crises, and natural 
disasters—before proceeding to focus on the first and dispense with 
the latter two.1 As a result, the literature is left heavily weighted on 
the side of violent crises triggered by armed conflict, terror threats, 
riots and rebellions. In this regard, it is noted, “liberal legal and 
political analysts have too often ignored the seriousness of the 
normative and institutional problems posed by the surprisingly 
pervasive reliance on emergency devices to grapple with the 
exigencies of economic affairs.”2 
The premise of an economic state of emergency is analogous to 
that presented to justify the invocation and entrenchment of 
extraordinary powers in relation to national security threats and 
political conflict. It bears a similar relation to the concept of the 
purported common good: temporary abdication of the rights of some 
 
1 In their introduction to one of the seminal post-2001 texts on the law of emergency 
powers, Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin explain that they do not intend to examine 
all types of emergencies but will rather focus on violent crises, nonetheless conceding that 
“emergency powers have been used in times of great economic consternation and in 
situations of severe natural disasters as frequently as, and perhaps even more than, in the 
context of violent crises.” OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF 
CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 4 (2006). Clinton Rossiter 
presents similar categories of emergency, albeit in a slightly different configuration, 
naming war, rebellion and economic depression as his primary troika, but also 
acknowledging extraordinary action in situations of natural disasters, riots and strikes. 
CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE 
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 6 (1948). Rossiter, for his part, does devote substantive attention 
to economic emergencies in the inter-war period. See generally id. 
2 William E. Scheuerman, The Economic State of Emergency, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1869, 1869–70 (2000). 
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is necessary in the greater public interest in order to stabilize and 
sustain a system seen as indispensable. In reality, however, in much 
the same way as such narratives of necessity underpin illiberal 
policies and consolidate security apparatuses in the political sphere, in 
the socio-economic realm they pay undue deference to capitalist 
institutions and obfuscate the notion of the common good by reifying 
elitist misappropriations of the “commons.” The general structures of 
international law are complicit in such misappropriations, as B.S. 
Chimni notes: 
Armed with the powers of international financial and trade 
institutions to enforce a neo-liberal agenda, international law today 
threatens to reduce the meaning of democracy to electing 
representatives who, irrespective of their ideological affiliations, are 
compelled to pursue the same social and economic policies. Even 
international human rights discourse is being manipulated to further 
and legitimize neo-liberal goals.3 
Indeed, concerns over the obfuscation of the common good in human 
rights discourse have lingered since the post-Cold War emergence of 
a market-friendly human rights paradigm that “reverses the notion 
that universal human rights are designed for the dignity and well-
being of human beings and insists, instead, upon the promotion and 
protection of the collective rights of global capital in ways that 
‘justify’ corporate well-being and dignity over that of human 
persons.”4 Emergency economic measures feed into this contradiction 
insofar as they are couched in terms of protection of the public 
interest, but in actuality function to dilute the state’s commitment to 
socio-economic rights, and the West’s commitment to global equality. 
The state of emergency, premised on temporariness, is invoked to 
institute legislative and institutional changes whose effect will be felt 
far beyond the immediacy of a given crisis. Whilst the problems of 
normalized and entrenched “exceptional” measures are endemic in the 
history and ongoing politics of national security emergencies, some 
commentators have plausibly argued that extra-constitutional 
responses to economic crises can ultimately degrade the interests of 
liberty as much as, or even more than, extra-constitutional responses 
to violent crises.5 
 
3 B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, 8 INT’L 
COMMUNITY L. REV. 3, 3 (2006). 
4 Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 163–64 (1998). 
5 See, e.g., Rebecca M. Kahan, Constitutional Stretch, Snap-Back, & Sag: Why 
Blaisdell was a Harsher Blow to Liberty than Korematsu, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1279 (2005). 
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The use of emergency measures as instruments of economic 
regulation and class subjugation must be understood against some 
important and related contextual backdrops: the intimate relationship 
that exists between capitalism and imperialism, the function of 
economic governance as an apparatus of security, and the 
susceptibility of capitalist economies to periodic “crisis.” Having 
introduced these underpinnings in Part I, emphasizing that the use of 
emergency powers in the economic sphere has long been entwined in 
colonial law and policy, this Article proceeds in Part II to trace the 
evolution of the economic state of emergency through the inter-war 
period in Europe and North America. Part III moves to examine the 
relevance of emergency discourse to the operation of the Bretton 
Woods institutions in the Third World, where the Machiavellian 
mindset of “opportunity in crisis” comes to the fore and emergency 
authority serves as a vehicle for the implementation of neoliberal 
doctrine and economic “shock therapy.” Part IV offers some thoughts 
on the versatile role of the doctrine of emergency in preserving and 
sustaining prevalent global capitalist structures, in such diverse guises 
as declarations of states of emergency to suppress protest movements, 
the ambiguous role of security exceptions in international trade and 
investment law, and the utilization of emergency discourse to justify 
austerity measures and bank “bailouts” in the post-2008 environment 
of Western financial meltdown. Even absent formal declarations of a 
state of emergency, the refrains and rhetoric of emergency, exception, 
and necessity remain a constant echo. 
I 
CAPITALIST EXPANSION AND COLONIAL EMERGENCY DOCTRINE 
The standard narrative on economically-rooted emergencies begins 
by recounting an extension of codified emergency powers in Europe 
and North America from their First World War military origins to 
impact upon economic issues in times of peace from the 1920s 
onwards. While the inter-war period did constitute a pivotal moment 
in the expansion of emergency economic governance, over-
emphasizing the point tends to obscure the fact that resort to 
exceptional powers in the context of class conflict has a history that 
long predates the First World War. Such a narrative also implies a 
postwar migration or seepage of special powers from security 
emergency to economic emergency that masks a deeper ideological 
circuit between political economy and national security discourses. 
The state of emergency has its colonial origins. The colonial 
account of emergency cannot be written without reference to 
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capitalist expansion. Until the mid-sixteenth century in England, the 
invocation of martial law against civilians remained restricted for the 
most part to instances of war and open rebellion. In the 1550s, a time 
of severe economic depression, martial law was invoked as a 
peacetime measure for the first time, deployed as a means of class and 
political repression against “those products of a depressed economy    
. . . general undesirables with no apparent means of support,”6 to stave 
off any inconvenient opposition to the Crown. With some initial 
hesitation about how it might be perceived, this shift was introduced 
cautiously by an establishment anxious to ensure that the first to be 
subjected to the new policy were not too close to home: in 1556, 
Mary I authorized the Marshal of the army in Ireland to proceed 
against “general undesirables” there by martial law.7 In 1562, Thomas 
Radcliffe, 3rd Earl of Sussex, recommended to the Queen that an 
English-born ruler be appointed to govern the Irish province of 
Munster, with the “authority to execute the martial law in times of 
necessity, but only against persons that have no possessions.”8 
The colonial nexus to peacetime emergency measures is thus 
evident from the outset, as is the class element of their invocation. 
The use of emergency measures as a form of class repression evolved 
in concert with colonial expansion, in the context of the broader, 
mutually interactive relationship between capitalism and colonialism. 
Marx and Engels show this relationship to be an organic one, in 
which colonialism is an outgrowth of the wider processes of capitalist 
transformation of European society.9 Discussion of the deeper 
complexities of that relationship—and the divergences, conflicts and 
internal contradictions of those theorizing it—is beyond the remit of 
this piece. Suffice it to emphasize that a wide spectrum of thinkers 
from classic liberal political economy10 to the Marxian tradition11 to 
 
6 J.V. Capua, The Early History of Martial Law in England from the Fourteenth 
Century to the Petition of Right, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 152, 164 (1977). 
7 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, IRELAND, 1509–1573, at 134 (Hans Claude Hamilton 
ed., 1974). 
8 CALENDAR OF THE CAREW MANUSCRIPTS, 1515–1574, at 336 (J.S. Brewer & 
William Bullen eds., 1867) 
9 The most comprehensive compendium of Marx and Engels’ writings on colonialism 
can be found in K. MARX & F. ENGELS, ON COLONIALISM (1960). 
10 See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS vol. II, at 25 (1776) (recognizing the economic benefits of 
colonialism, “[b]y opening a new and inexhaustible market to all the commodities of 
Europe, [colonial expansion] gave occasion to new divisions of labour and improvements 
of art, which, in the narrow circle of the antient [sic] commerce, could never have taken 
place”). 
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Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)12 
persuasively demonstrate the economic underpinnings of colonial 
expansion by capitalist powers.13 Put simply, “[e]conomization and 
colonization were synonymous.”14 Many of the key factors in this 
equation are self-evident, particularly with reference to the 
intensification of imperial conquest in the mid-nineteenth century: the 
explosive increase in the European population and its heightened 
capacity for overseas movement;15 the move to industrialism and the 
demand for raw materials; the supply of food and raw materials in 
both the “capitalist neo-Europes” of the temperate “empty” lands of 
the Americas, southern Africa and Australia, and the “tropical 
periphery” of Asia, Africa and the Caribbean.16 What is also striking 
is the role of economic crises at home in the proliferation of conquest 
abroad. Europe’s major economic depression of the nineteenth 
century came in the 1870s on the heels of the free market and free 
trade policies that had been entrenched in the early to mid-nineteenth 
century. Karl Polyani reminds us that by this time the formation of 
international economic structures were predicated on a deep-seated 
belief in the ability of the free market to organize life.17 When 
 
11 See RUDOLPH HILFERDING, FINANCE CAPITAL: A STUDY OF THE LATEST PHASE OF 
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT (Tom Bottomore ed., Morris Watnick & Sam Gordon trans., 
1981) (1910); ROSA LUXEMBURG, THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL–AN ANTI-CRITIQUE 
(Kenneth J. Tarbuck ed., Rudolf Wichmann trans., 1972) (1913); NIKOLAI BUKHARIN, 
IMPERIALISM AND WORLD ECONOMY (The Merlin Press 1972) (1917); V.I. LENIN, 
IMPERIALISM: THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM (International Publishers 1939) 
(1917). Lenin’s work was heavily influenced by J.A. HOBSON, IMPERIALISM: A STUDY 
(1902). 
12 See, e.g., Chimni, supra note 3. See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
13 As B.S. Chimni points out, however, more contemporary liberal thinkers (such as 
John Rawls) and theorists of capitalism (such as Milton Friedman) fail to acknowledge the 
relationship between imperialism and capitalism. See B.S. Chimni, Capitalism, 
Imperialism and International Law in the 21st Century, Keynote Address at the Oregon 
Review of International Law Symposium: Third World Approaches to International Law 
(Oct. 20, 2011). 
14
 Gustavo Esteva, Development, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO 
KNOWLEDGE AS POWER 6, 14 (Wolfgang Sachs ed., 2010). 
15 Michael Williams, The Relations of Environmental History and Historical 
Geography, 20 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 12 (1994). 
16 B.R. Tomlinson, Economics and Empire: The Periphery and the Imperial Economy, 
in OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, VOLUME III: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
53, 55 (Andrew Porter ed., 1999). “[E]mpty” is used “in the sense that the native peoples 
were ultimately unable to mount an effective resistance to capitalist colonization.” Id. at 
56. 
17 For a TWAIL perspective of international political economy based on an insightful 
reading of Karl Polanyi THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORIGIN OF OUR TIME (1944), see Michael Fakhri, Law as the Interplay of Ideas, 
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currency fragility and falling profits threatened the stability of social 
organization, unflinching faith in the market and conviction of the 
necessity of free trade meant that the only logical response was a 
drive for new markets and more resources. Hence a wave of major 
colonial expansion that encompassed the “scramble for Africa” and 
the Berlin Conference in the 1880s. 
What of the role of law in these developments? In the colonial 
domain, as elsewhere, legal relations and forms of state are molded by 
the material conditions of social life, of which the economic structure 
of society is an integral component. As Mohamed Bedjaoui’s 
quintessential quote—holding classical international law to be imbued 
with, inter alia, “a geographical basis (it was a European law) . . . 
[and] an economic motivation (it was a mercantilist law)”18—
suggests, international legal structures were shaped in their origins by 
European economic exploitation of the Third World. The legal form 
of the colonial state itself encouraged and incentivized capitalist 
tendencies by coupling a framework for commercial exploitation of 
the colonies with policies of protectionism for its own planters and 
industrialists. As the model of colonial economic policy advanced 
towards a free trade model in the nineteenth century, so too did 
Western legal systems, and in turn, international legal norms and 
practice. 
The part played by law in the expansion of capitalist production is 
elucidated in a 1987 collection of readings on The Political Economy 
of Law, which provides insight into the multiple ways in which 
colonial law fostered capitalist institutions, sought to facilitate the 
replacement of a subsistence agrarian economy with a capital/wage-
labor matrix, and underpinned the integration of peripheral countries 
into the world economy.19 The volume demonstrates the influence of 
the expansion of European and United States enterprise on patterns of 
economic development and social structures in the Third World, with 
the dominance of capital secured through colonial governance. Socio-
economic disparities originally produced by direct rule nowadays tend 
to reproduce themselves through less overt forms of imperial 
coercion; consequently, new institutions and rules have evolved to 
 
Institutions, and Interests: Using Polyani (and Foucault) to ask TWAIL Questions, 10 
INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 455 (2008). 
18 Mohammed Bedjaoui, Poverty of the International Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 152, 154 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985). 
19 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW: A THIRD WORLD READER (Yash Ghai et al. 
eds., 1987). 
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maintain the hegemony of Western capitalism. These include the 
international financial institutions and sovereign power-wielding 
multinational corporations, as well as regulatory frameworks for 
intellectual property. 
The narrative of apolitical law and legal institutions obscures the 
inequalities that are intrinsic to the international legal order. Even 
where colonized and colonizer are framed as formally equal before 
the law, the premises of the legal form and its basic concepts—such 
as contract and property—inherently favor those endowed with 
economic power, access to information concerning the law, and close 
ties to the state.20 Thus, in the Ocean Island cases,21 “classic 
assumptions of contract had been vitiated by the gross imbalance in 
the parties’ political and economic power.”22 Furnivall explains such 
disparity with reference to the social context of the colonies—plural 
societies where two distinct groups interact only through commerce 
and are subject to no common standards except those of law as it 
regulates the market.23 This law reflects the will and economic 
interests of the dominant power; “[t]he rule of law becomes in effect 
the rule of economic law.”24 The raison d’être of the rule of law in the 
colonies was, in essence, the fostering of commerce.25 
Anghie brings us back to the British East India Company as the 
embryo in which commercial interests and colonial governance 
coalesced. In exercising sovereign powers over non-European 
territories, the company “established systems of law and governance 
that were directed at furthering the commercial relations that were the 
very sine qua non of their existence . . . . The governance of non-
European territories was assessed principally on the basis of whether 
it enabled Europeans to live and trade as they wished.”26 This 
 
20 Id. at 3. 
21 See infra Part IV. 
22 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW, supra note 19, at 4. 
23 See J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
LAW, supra note 19 at 117. 
24 Id. at 125. 
25 For further elaboration see J.S. FURNIVALL, PROGRESS AND WELFARE IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA: A COMPARISON OF COLONIAL POLICY AND PRACTICE (1941); J.S. 
FURNIVALL, COLONIAL POLICY AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BURMA AND 
NETHERLANDS INDIA (1948). 
26 ANGHIE, supra note 12, at 252. As Anghie points out, for positivists such as 
Westlake, the absence outside of Europe of a regulatory system for European commercial 
activity was justification in itself for the imposition of colonial rule and law: “non-
European states were uncivilized unless they could provide a system of government ‘under 
the protection of which . . . the former [Europeans] may carry on the complex life to which 
they have been accustomed in their homes.’ If such government was lacking, Westlake 
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association between governance and commerce was augmented and 
refined under the direct governmental rule that succeeded the trading 
companies, culminating in the focus of the Berlin Conference on the 
efficient and orderly mercantile exploitation of Africa, with 
commercial development presented to the world as the means by 
which backward populations could enter the world of civilization. The 
role of capitalism in the civilizing mission was elaborated through the 
colonial project’s dual mandate of civilization and commerce,27 which 
would carry through to the League of Nations’ missionary calling. It 
was during the League period that Anghie’s “dynamic of difference”28 
evolved from a purely racial construct to one also infused with a class 
element, through characterizations of the non-European world as 
economically primitive. He shows that irrespective of rhetoric as to 
humanism and the well-being of Third World peoples, the 
commercial and trade interests of the West have remained paramount 
through the centuries. The “developed” versus “undeveloped” binary 
constructed during the League persists today, permeating the 
pretensions of the international financial institutions to economic 
development and poverty alleviation in the Third World.29 The 
fundamental tension that has prevailed since the Mandate system—
between political independence on the one hand and economic 
subordination on the other—is constitutive of the reality that the core 
economic aspects of colonialism persist in a neocolonial, imperial 
configuration. This entails the continuation of an asymmetrical 
relationship between core and peripheral states, which is predisposed 
to benefit the core and facilitate a steady transfer of resources from 
the periphery.30 Subsumed into those relations is now an emerging 
 
argued, ‘government should be furnished.’” Id. (citing JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON 
THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141–42 (1894)). 
27 See SIR F.D. LUGARD, THE DUAL MANDATE IN BRITISH TROPICAL AFRICA (5th ed. 
1965). 
28 ANGHIE, supra note 12, at 37. 
29 Id. at 267–68. 
30 Core-periphery theory and related world-systems theory are elucidated extensively in 
this context in the works of Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin. See IMMANUEL 
WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM I: CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND THE 
ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1974); 
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN: THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM II: MERCANTILISM AND THE 
CONSOLIDATION OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY, 1600–1750 (1980); IMMANUEL 
WALLERSTEIN: THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM III: THE SECOND GREAT EXPANSION OF 
THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY, 1730–1840’S (1989); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN : 
THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM IV: CENTRIST LIBERALISM TRIUMPHANT, 1789–1914 
(2011). See also, e.g., SAMIR AMIN, IMPERIALISM AND UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT (1977). 
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transnational capitalist class in the periphery that transcends North-
South divides without challenging the existing structures. 
In both the colonial and “post-colonial” setting, the rule of liberal 
international law functions to reinforce the capitalist agenda in several 
ways, including through the development of a doctrine of emergency 
that is not only racially contingent but is underpinned by class and 
commercial interests. It goes without saying that colonialism, 
capitalism, race, and class are immensely weighty analytic categories, 
and it is beyond the purview of this article to attempt to fully capture 
or reconcile them all. They interact in a profusion of intricate, 
unwieldy, and untold ways. The most that this article ventures to 
suggest in this regard is that the evolution of emergency doctrine 
plays a notable role in those interactions; the concepts intersect in 
particular ways through the doctrine of emergency. 
The history of the British empire is replete with the use of 
emergency measures to support and sustain the colonial economic 
architecture, whether in the suppression of the 1865 peasant uprising 
in Jamaica,31 the protection of settler plantation interests in India by 
consistent recourse to martial law, or the invocation of a state of 
emergency to crush native trade unionism in Malaysia.32 Britain’s 
resort to emergency laws and special powers in the 1940s and 1950s 
in a last-ditch bid to prevent the fragmentation of the empire was 
particularly pronounced. It also had a profound effect on the 
international human rights treaties being drafted at the time, with a 
Britain deeply engulfed in its colonial emergencies insisting on the 
 
31 See R.W. KOSTAL, A JURISPRUDENCE OF POWER: VICTORIAN EMPIRE AND THE 
RULE OF LAW (2005); David Dyzenhaus, The Puzzle of Martial Law, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 
1 (2009). 
32 The backdrop to anticolonial agitation by the Malayan Communist Party and the 
invocation of the state of emergency in June 1948 was a rapid expansion of trade unionism 
from 1945 and a bolstered consciousness and assertion of workers’ rights, culminating in 
large-scale industrial conflict and repression by colonial authorities. At the meeting of 
colonial government officials in Malaya in May 1948 that initiated the process by which 
the emergency would be declared, it was decided that measures should include “a 
simultaneous raid on the headquarters of the PMFTU [Pan Malayan Federation of Trade 
Unions] in Kuala Lumpur and of the Federations in each of the states.” ANTHONY SHORT, 
THE COMMUNIST INSURRECTION IN MALAYA, 1948–60, at 67–68 (1975). See also 
Michael Morgan, The Rise and Fall of Malayan Trade Unionism, 1945-50, in MALAYA: 
THE MAKING OF A NEO COLONY 150 (Mohamed Amin & Malcolm Caldwell eds., 1977); 
KUMAR RAMAKRISHNA, EMERGENCY PROPAGANDA: THE WINNING OF MALAYAN 
HEARTS AND MINDS 1948–1958 (2002). 
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inclusion of an option to derogate from treaty obligations during a 
state of declared emergency.33 
* 
 
My account and analysis of economic states of emergency entails 
some inherent meditation on the nature of capitalist state, how it can 
be harnessed by certain interests and how it is wont to act in the 
interest of the bourgeois class in order to preserve and sustain itself.  
To continue functioning, as some of the examples elucidated below 
will illustrate, the capitalist state acts, for instance, to stave off or 
deflect internal crises, and to discipline labor. Such functions 
foreground how the state as an institution is itself central to the 
process of accumulation. Here, two particular features of capitalism 
abound and warrant brief mention.  
First, capitalism is prone to crisis, and for the purposes of self-
preservation, such crises must be mitigated. Marxists, Minskyians and 
Keynesians and other schools of heterodox economics may vary in 
their diagnoses of exactly how and why capitalist systems have an 
innate proclivity to instability but all essentially agree on the 
fundamental point: that crisis is structurally endemic in capitalism.34 
Second, capitalism is prone to challenges aimed at redistribution or 
reduction of inequalities; challenges which must similarly be 
managed. In both regards, the versatility of emergency discourse in 
sustaining existing patterns of capital accumulation comes to the fore; 
whether in allowing economic institutions to compel states to adopt 
unpopular austerity measures as a technique of crisis management, or 
enabling the suppress of domestic protest or industrial action. In other 
words, the emergency paradigm will surface, regardless of the 
rationality underpinning a particular form or “art” of government at a 
particular point in time. 
Here, we can make a link to Michel Foucault. Emergency doctrine 
purports to provide security from an impending “threat to the life of 
 
33 See John Reynolds, The Long Shadow of Colonialism: The Origins of the Doctrine of 
Emergency in International Human Rights Law, 6 OSGOODE COMP. RES. L. POL. ECON. 1, 
16–30 (2010). 
34 For contemporary Marxist analyses, see, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF 
CAPITAL AND THE CRISES OF CAPITALISM (2010); John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. 
McChesney, Monopoly-Finance Capital and the Paradox of Accumulation, 61 MONTHLY 
REV. 1–20 (2009). For Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, see Hyman P. Minsky, 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working 
Paper No. 74 (May 1992). For an outline of the structural Keynesian perspective as well as 
a succinct overview of the commonalities and divergences between the varying positions, 
see Thomas I. Palley, The Limits of Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis as an 
Explanation of the Crisis, 61 MONTHLY REV. 28–43 (2010). 
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the nation.” Reliance on emergency doctrine in the economic realm 
can be seen as symptomatic of a particularly Foucauldian idea of 
economic governance as itself an apparatus of security. In the shift 
from sovereignty to governmentality, Foucault identifies an emergent 
and distinct form of government in which the institutions of 
sovereignty are supplemented by those of economy. The essence of 
the “art of government” acquires as its primary objective the 
economy; it becomes “the art of exercising power in the form and 
according to the model of the economy.”35  Within the context of 
what he delineates as the “sovereignty-discipline-government” 
triangle, Foucault emphasizes the inter-relatedness of security and 
economy in a configuration that has the population as its primary 
target, political economy as its principal form of knowledge and 
security apparatuses as its essential mechanisms.36 Agamben sees the 
manner in which this move to the security paradigm occurs as related 
less to human security and more to economic gain: “Foucault showed 
how security becomes in the 18th century a paradigm of government. 
For Quesnay, Targot and the other physiocratic politicians, security 
did not mean the prevention of famines and catastrophes, but meant 
allowing them to happen and then being able to orientate them in a 
profitable direction.”37 
This is mirrored in the contemporary “homeland security” 
incarnation of the security paradigm. Crises continue to provide 
opportunity for profit—indeed, it is often in the state of crisis and 
instability that profits are optimized—and are thus actively sought by 
market forces. In this context, political economy remains inseparable 
from security; the economic and the political cannot be disentangled. 
Similarly, political emergencies invariably have socioeconomic 
consequences just as economic emergencies entail political 
consequences. Emergencies triggered by natural disasters, such as that 
in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, are likely to have both 
political and economic ramifications that intersect with questions of 
security. Agamben refers us back to the state of siege declared on the 
occasion of the 1908 earthquake in Messina and Reggio Calabria, 
which he characterizes as “only apparently a different situation” from 
previous states of siege stemming from public disturbances—
ultimately proclaimed as it was for reasons of public order—but 
 
35 Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN 
GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 92 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991). 
36 Id. at 102. 
37 Ulrich Raulff, An Interview with Giorgio Agamben, 5 GERMAN L.J. 609, 611 (2004). 
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which notably formed the basis for the elaboration of jurisprudential 
theses that distinguished necessity as the primary source of law.38 
II 
THE ECONOMIC-FINANCIAL STATE OF EMERGENCY 
The flaws of Carl Schmitt’s theoretical inquiry and the 
perniciousness of his ideological stance notwithstanding, William 
Scheuerman concludes that the German jurist’s work provides a 
useful insight into some of the real failings of capitalist liberal 
democracy,39 particularly in relation to what Schmitt termed the 
“economic-financial state of emergency.”40 Schmitt, indeed, did 
accurately highlight the tendency of liberal discourse post-First World 
War to equate economic and financial crises with the threats posed by 
military attack or armed rebellion. In this conflation, security of 
capital becomes entwined with the state of emergency in the same 
manner as national security. Governmental assumption of emergency 
powers to pursue pervasive economic measures is justified on the 
same premise of necessity. This engenders the class component of the 
story of emergency. 
Emergency intervention in the economy by the Western state has 
long been common in contexts of war or insurrection, and in contexts 
of race and class domination in the colonies. It is with the shift from 
sovereignty to governmentality in the eighteenth century that 
economic emergency authority comes to the fore in its own right, and 
the broad scope of “emergency” is fully revealed. With labor and 
socialist agitation emerging as a challenge to capitalist hegemony, 
constitutional emergency clauses are ready-made for legalized 
crackdowns. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx 
describes the use of French Revolution “state of siege” emergency 
provisions as a weapon in the hands of the “bourgeois dictatorship,” 
invoked to buttress class privilege and sideline the interests of 
workers and petty bourgeoisie in nineteenth-century France.41 Clinton 
Rossiter would later observe that such devices of constitutional 
dictatorship as the French état de siège—as well as Article 48 of the 
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Weimar Constitution and the Emergency Powers Act 1920 in 
Britain—are “ideally suited to be employed as a weapon of reaction 
and class struggle.”42 
In the twentieth century inter-war period, the use of emergency 
powers to regulate the economy was an integral element of the 
political governance of major Western states,43 prompting depictions 
of “economic dictatorship” in Weimar Germany and the United 
States.44 Scheuerman describes a rudimentary sequential pattern in the 
story of emergency economic power that we can extract in some 
shape or form from the experiences of Britain, the United States, 
Germany, and France during the two World Wars. According to this 
delineation, emergency powers operated in the economic realm 
initially to stifle one of the most visible products of a crisis-ridden 
capitalist economy, the workers’ movement, before being invoked to 
manage the economy itself and later as an instrument to preclude the 
return or continuation of instability.45 
Permeating this process is a fundamental conflation of economy 
and security, evident on both sides of the Atlantic through perceptions 
of workers as security threats and the construction of economic crises 
as warlike situations. After the Civil War, the primary function of 
martial law in the United States was as a “household remedy” to 
quash the growing labor movement.46 Through the inter-war period, 
Western liberal democracy deployed the rhetoric and executive 
authority of military confrontation in its “war” against the economic 
crisis that threatened to annihilate finance capitalism. Franklin D. 
Roosevelt epitomized this in his demand for “broad Executive power 
to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would 
be given to [him] if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”47 
Executive regulation of the economy is generally seen as having been 
relatively effective in the case of Roosevelt and the New Deal, but the 
socio-political perils of unfettered emergency power became all too 
real in the French and German cases, where “the unlimited decree-
rule of a constitutional government with a dubious popular or 
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parliamentary basis serve[d] only as an intermediate station on the 
road to complete authoritarianism.”48 
In Britain from the 1920s onwards, labor movements and industrial 
unrest were viewed and portrayed by business and political elites as a 
form of civil insurrection, an intemperate uprising against liberal 
conceptions of an ultimately flourishing and lucrative market 
economy. These portrayals were in turn reflected in the emergency 
laws and powers deployed against such movements. Such practices 
followed the trend that had long been set in the colonies, where 
strikes or protests by native workers would be painted with the 
“security threat” brush and colonial governors would declare a state 
of emergency to legitimize the use of force in their suppression. 
The enabling legal framework emanated from the wartime 
codification of emergency powers in mainland Britain, which itself 
brought home the colonial experience from Ireland and India in 
particular. Although the Defense of the Realm Act 1914 lapsed in 
1921, the sweeping authority that the Cabinet had become 
accustomed to during the war years would inform future policy and 
extend to a range of economic issues in times of peace. With the 
“power [that the Defense of the Realm Act] had brought them still 
fresh in their minds, the members of the Cabinet decided to ask 
Parliament for a direct grant of emergency competence, couched in 
terms of a permanent statute.”49 Emergency powers were henceforth 
institutionalized in Britain in the form of legislation that Rossiter 
describes as “a revolution in English politics and government.”50 The 
Emergency Powers Act 192051 allowed the Crown to proclaim a state 
of emergency under certain circumstances in relation to the supply 
and distribution of necessities (including food, water, fuel and light) 
and granted special powers to the police in such regard, as well as 
effectively allowing for military intervention. Although presented by 
the government as discharging a longstanding commitment to such 
legislation based on the war experience in order to protect essential 
supplies, the social context in which the bill was passed is instructive. 
Rushed through parliament during strikes by miners and railway 
workers in October 1920, amidst a broader climate of escalating class 
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conflict, it was “abundantly clear to everyone that the new act was 
intended to be used against the strikers.”52 
Scheuerman zooms in on the Act as a 
microcosm of the entire history of economic emergency power 
between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries: its 
proximity to the wartime context linked it to an earlier tradition in 
which emergency power chiefly functioned as a tool against violent 
uprisings and foreign invasions; its anti-strike thrust tied it closely 
to the widespread tendency to rely on emergency authority against 
the labor movement; and finally, the Act’s forthright concern with 
guaranteeing the “supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, or 
light” clearly pointed the way towards the employment of 
emergency authority for peacetime economic coordination.53 
While ostensibly confined to the category of essential supplies, the 
reach of the Act would in practice “encompass a broader gamut of 
economic matters, industrial disputes and class conflict.”54 Enacted as 
a permanent but dormant piece of law, it was quickly and consistently 
called into life: in 1921 in response to the coal strike; in 1924 for 
sectional transport workers’ strikes; and in 1926 when the general 
strike throughout Britain was called.55 In the last case, the strike itself 
lasted only a few days, while the state of emergency continued for 
eight months.56 By this point the pretence of a link to military conflict 
or armed insurrection as integral to the notion of emergency had 
evaporated. Even outside of declared emergencies, the exception 
continued as the norm in Britain through the economic instability of 
the 1920s and 1930s: “drastic emergency laws were enacted in the 
normal manner”;57 that is, through the regular parliamentary 
legislative process. Specific recourse to emergency executive 
authority in the form of enabling acts—delegating law-making power 
to the cabinet of Ramsay MacDonald’s emergency “national 
government”—was made during the severe depression of 1931–
1932.58 
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It was in the context of the same economic maladies that Roosevelt 
immediately waged war on the emergency upon election in 1933. His 
inaugural address was drenched with military analogy, alluding to the 
“leadership of this great army of our people dedicated to a disciplined 
attack upon our common problems” and “treating the task as we 
would treat the emergency of a war.”59 Two days later, without 
recourse to Congress, the President officially declared a state of 
emergency, and would rely on not only the language, but the legal 
framework of war to jettison regular legislative procedures and turn to 
executive emergency powers for economic regulation.60 For 
Roosevelt, this was an emergency that related to far more than banks: 
“it covered the whole economic and therefore the whole social 
structure of the country.”61 Whether it could be said to constitute an 
impending threat to the life of the nation or the existence of the state, 
however, is doubtful. Regardless, Roosevelt summoned the 
appreciable executive prerogative provided by the Trading with the 
Enemy Act 1917 and passed much of the emergency banking 
regulations of 1933 and other early New Deal legislation under its 
expanded rubric.62 The result was “a group of emergency statutes 
delegating the President unprecedented power to wage war on the 
economic front.”63 Such legislation began with declarations of an 
“acute economic emergency” characterizing disparities in the market 
as detrimental to the “national public interest,”64 and subsequently 
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granted the executive an essentially unfettered ability to regulate 
industry and to authorize monopolies and cartels in certain sectors.65 
Emergency powers also filtered through to industrial conflict; 
according to congressional records, there were over thirty labor 
disputes between 1933 and 1935 in which the military was deployed 
to intervene on grounds of emergency.66 Neocleous presents the New 
Deal as “emergency rule writ large”67 and frames it in the context of a 
nexus between emergency powers and security that had become 
central to political administration. Rooted as it is in a distinctly 
economic emergency, this nexus feeds in to my argument regarding 
the broader relationship between security and economy: “[i]n 
conjoining the security project with the ‘emergency situation’ faced 
by global capital, the U.S. was able to gain ideological support for 
both the politico-strategic and economic dimensions of liberal order 
building: to think simultaneously about the security of capital and the 
American state.”68 
The embedded doctrine of emergency would persist in the United 
States and elsewhere long beyond the conclusion of the New Deal and 
the ensuing emergency created by the Second World War. The end of 
the war may have been assumed to herald the end of any remaining 
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threat to the life of the nation, and a return to normalcy. Yet wartime 
emergency powers as set out in Britain by the Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act 1939 were again retained by government to facilitate 
broad executive control in the economic sphere, including over 
industrial relations and the market price of supplies and services.69 
The Emergency Powers Act 1920 (as amended by the Emergency 
Powers Act 1964) was consistently invoked during strikes between 
the late 1940s and the 1980s,70 with the Crown regularly declaring an 
official state of emergency, as in 1973 when on the basis of 
“industrial disputes affecting persons employed in the coal mines and 
in the electricity supply industry . . . ‘Her Majesty . . . deemed it 
proper . . . to declare that a state of emergency exists.’”71 Such routine 
exercise of emergency powers essentially as a weapon of class 
warfare personify Leonard Feldman’s image of the “prosaic politics 
of emergency.”72 Emergency remained the default setting throughout 
the British Empire, with one count tallying twenty-nine separate 
declarations of emergency between 1946 and 1960 in colonies from 
Aden to Zanzibar,73 many relating to economic matters and to class as 
well as racial subjugation. 
Likewise in the United States, reliance on emergency powers to 
manage the economy continued in the post-war years, with successive 
presidents relying upon “a broad range of emergency delegations of 
impressive power to conclude strikes, control international trade, and 
even reshuffle the rules of the international monetary system.”74 
Martial law was even invoked to curb labor movements in the 1950s 
and 1960s;75 President Nixon proclaimed a national emergency in 
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order to force the discontinuation of a postal strike in 1970, and 
another the following year in an attempt to manage an international 
monetary crisis by terminating certain trade agreement clauses and 
imposing import duties.76 Based on the fact that the country had been 
in a state of emergency since March 1933, comprised in fact of four 
overlapping presidentially-proclaimed states of national emergency 
(three of which were purely economic in character), a Special 
Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency had been 
established “to examine the consequences of terminating the declared 
states of national emergency.”77 Notably, this Committee reported 
that the plethora78 of emergency statutes enacted over the preceding 
four decades delegated to the executive not only exceptional military 
authority but also distinctly economic powers to “seize property; 
organize and control the means of production; seize commodities.”79 
From the process initiated by the Committee’s report came the 
National Emergencies Act 1976 to regulate exceptional executive 
authority, and to repeal many of the emergency measures.80 Certain 
key provisions remained in place, however,81 and broad authority was 
vested in the executive by the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act 1977 to restrict trade and commerce with states or classes 
of persons seen as providing a threat to the United States.82 A 
presidential declaration of national emergency in relation to the threat 
is required to trigger the Act, and many such declarations have been 
made in relation to internal issues in states such as Burma, Belarus, 
and Libya.83 How repressive practices by undemocratic regimes in 
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distant corners of world, against their own peoples, constitute national 
emergencies in the United States is unclear. Regardless, the effect is 
further “emergency” regulation of economic activity. 
Emergency governance of economic affairs is not limited to 
Europe and North America. Emergency powers in Israel, commonly 
assumed to be confined to national security matters, are “exercised in 
an almost routine fashion” with respect to industrial disputes, labor 
law, trade and monetary issues. Emergency powers are invoked, for 
example, as a convenient way of bypassing onerous labor dispute 
resolution processes.84 In Sri Lanka, the long-standing state of 
emergency was retained and renewed until late 2011 despite an overt 
end to its underlying conflict in early 2009.85 Through the intervening 
period, the coalescence of political and economic emergency powers 
manifested in the utilization of emergency regulations to implement 
economic cutbacks at the behest of the International Monetary Fund, 
and to suppress popular opposition to such cuts. Indeed, intervention 
by the international financial institutions in the Third World has 
frequently been entwined with emergency discourse. 
III 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND OPPORTUNITY IN 
CRISIS 
Since the collapse of the Soviet barriers to a capitalist world 
market, “end of history” globalization narratives have predominated. 
For world-systems theorists such as Samir Amin, globalization—
“associated with the spread and deepening of capitalism”86 does not 
represent a departure from previous trajectories, but rather a fine-
tuning of imperial structures that has similar objectives (market 
expansion and control, harnessing of natural resources and 
exploitation of labor in the periphery) at its heart.87 From the 
perspective of the Third World, global market fusion connotes the 
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consolidated management of the non-European world by international 
institutions in the form of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank, through the “techniques and technologies generated 
by globalization and governance.”88 Viewed through a TWAIL lens, 
therefore, globalization means simply that “domination is global.”89 
What can be described as “the relocation of sovereign economic 
powers in international trade and financial institutions” constitutes a 
form of “recolonization” that haunts the Third World.90 
Nation-state sovereignty, so long the light at the end of the tunnel 
for the anti-colonial emancipatory struggle, has proven illusory for 
Third World peoples, recalibrated and diluted by the forces of global 
capital flows. As such, colonial political hegemony is reincarnated in 
an economic avatar, courtesy of the market. The dilution of nation-
state sovereignty does not denote the decline of sovereignty itself, 
however; it has rather assumed a more global guise in the form of a 
series of national and supranational organisms. Where nation-state 
imperialism involved the extension of the sovereignty of European 
states beyond their own boundaries, global corporate imperialism is 
rooted less in individual territorial power centers and more in the 
globalization of capitalist production and trade. 
While by definition no single nation-state can form the center of 
this diffuse apparatus, the United States has for several decades 
occupied a privileged position, owing not in this case to its 
similarities to the old European imperialist powers but to its 
differences; by the fact that its hegemony is not based upon, or 
limited by, territorial boundaries.91 As the Second World War dragged 
on, the colonial empires of increasingly weakened and destabilized 
European powers began to appear vulnerable. The U.S. administration 
had been actively planning for the implementation of a new post-war 
world order since 1940, with three priorities on the agenda: 
“reconstructing Europe, containing communism and reaping the 
spoils of the collapsing European colonial empires”;92 the latter being 
crucial to American access to raw materials, as well as market and 
capital investment expansion (much as it is to China today). Thus, in 
the years that followed, “colonies” would be succeeded by 
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“underdeveloped regions” in need of international development 
assistance and private investment (regardless of the views of the 
populations concerned). The Bretton Woods international financial 
institutions93 became the de facto managers of economic policy in the 
vast majority of “developing” countries, imposing Western 
conceptions of “good governance” through “structural adjustment 
programmes” that necessitated radical economic restructuring 
(including liberalization of trade and markets, increased privatization 
and reduced social spending; all to the benefit of the industrialized 
North and conducive to the maintenance of international economic 
structures that prejudice the South) and produced a deepening vortex 
of debt and dependency.94 
Such involvement of the World Bank and IMF in the domestic 
affairs of Third World states and eastern bloc countries in post-Soviet 
transition has typically been premised on a form of emergency 
discourse that serves as a convenient conduit for the infliction of 
neoliberal doctrine and economic “shock therapy.” The theory 
underpinning the “the crisis hypothesis” articulated by Mancur 
Olson95 and others is that societies that experience no major crises 
have a natural tendency over time to become increasingly susceptible 
to the influence of pressure groups (representing, for instance, cotton-
farmers, steel-producers or trade unions) and the demands of ordinary 
workers and voters. On the basis of an argument that protectionist 
policies advocated by such interest groups are regressive and 
detrimental to economic growth, neoliberal doctrinaires realized the 
benefits to interruptions of the “normal” circumstances under which 
such policies are able to blossom. They sought to establish the need 
for radical policy reform to emerge from the ashes of any national 
crisis, to capitalize accordingly where such crises occur, and even to 
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consider purposely engendering real or apparent crises where they do 
not occur “naturally”: 
If it indeed proves difficult to identify cases of the sort of extensive 
policy reform needed to make the transition to an open, competitive, 
market economy that were not a response to a fundamental crisis, 
then one will have to ask whether it could conceivably make sense 
to think of deliberately provoking a crisis so as to remove the 
political logjam to reform . . . . Is it possible to conceive of a 
pseudo-crisis that could serve the same positive function without 
the costs of a real crisis?96 
Applied to structural adjustment programs in the Third World, the 
idea was based on two simple elements: nations engulfed in an 
emergency often require financial assistance to stabilize their 
situation, and in the context of such emergency circumstances a 
sweeping overhaul of economic policy and structure will be easier for 
its advocates to justify, more difficult for its opponents to resist. The 
state of emergency emerges as “a stabilizing political strategy; a true 
foundation of ‘predatory capitalism.’”97 Milton Friedman and the 
“Chicago School” economists were early pioneers of this philosophy 
in the operation of American foreign policy in the global South, 
which was implemented through alliances with cooperative leaders in 
the countries concerned (often installed by undemocratic means to 
replace uncooperative counterparts) and through coercive loan 
packages that tied financial assistance to privatization and free-trade 
policies. 
One of the first significant laboratories in which this experiment 
was tested was Chile, where following General Pinochet’s U.S.-
sponsored military coup in 1973, a state of siege was declared, martial 
law introduced and parliament suspended. In the shadows of the 
upheaval and turmoil, complete liberalization of the economy and 
repeal of Salvador Allende’s social protections were quickly instituted 
by Pinochet’s Chicago School-trained team of economists.98 Chile 
remained under either a state of siege or a state of emergency (the 
latter being the less draconian of the two under Chilean law) for the 
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majority of Pinochet’s seventeen-year rule,99 with the regime 
oscillating between the two legal frameworks according to prevailing 
socio-economic conditions. Emergency measures—including twenty-
four hour curfews, comprehensive media censorship, banning of 
political parties and prohibition of trade union activities—fed into 
broader repressive policies of extra-judicial killings, torture, 
disappearances and mass displacement. Throughout the 1970s, the 
military junta expanded and systematized emergency powers before 
incorporating them into a new Chilean constitution in 1980.100 The 
state of siege had been reduced to a state of emergency in 1978 only 
to be reinstated in 1984 following protests against widespread 
unemployment and government repression of trade unions. In 1985, 
Pinochet hastily lifted the state of siege to ensure U.S. support in 
advance of a vote on a World Bank loan to Chile,101 again reverting 
the following year. A similar state of indefinite exception was born of 
the crisis conditions of hyperinflation in Bolivia, which executed its 
own neoliberal shock therapy program in the 1980s under the guise of 
a state of national emergency. 
On the back of such relatively successful dilution of democracy 
and introduction of emergency free-market reforms in Latin America, 
by the late 1980s the international financial institutions themselves—
moving inexorably towards the tellingly-named “Washington 
Consensus” on the need for deregulation, increased privatization and 
reduced social spending—were subsuming free-market requirements 
into the debt relief and emergency loan packages provided to crisis-
ridden Third World states.102 A similar model was incorporated into 
the IMF’s engagement in the post-Soviet transition in Eastern Europe, 
in which emergency powers were necessary to carry the type of 
economic reconstruction advocated by the market capitalist gurus that 
descended on Warsaw, Riga, and Moscow. The result was that soon 
thereafter, “[n]eoliberalism and relatively open-ended delegations of 
exceptional legislative authority to the executive, justified by 
reference to the spectre of economic instability, are now political 
bedfellows in fledgling liberal democracies from Moscow to Buenos 
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Aires.”103 In a climate of global economic integration, the assumption 
of exceptional executive discretion to administer the decisions of 
international financial overlords is perhaps now easier than ever for 
domestic governments to justify, endowed as they are with an 
opportune smokescreen behind which to pursue objectionable socio-
economic policies. This has been seen in varying degrees from the 
well-documented cases of Russia and Argentina, to those of 
Thailand—where economic shock treatment was disbursed through 
the emergency medicine of executive decree—and Algeria, where 
Washington Consensus policies of loan dependency and domestic 
austerity through the 1990s were followed by further IMF-driven 
reforms under a 2001 Emergency Reconstruction Plan that promoted 
foreign exploitation of Algeria’s hydrocarbons.104 
It may once have been the case that “Western states are immune 
from the operations of the [international financial institutions] 
although they engage in forms of protectionism, for example, that 
have been targeted by the [international financial institutions] when 
present in Third World societies.”105 Western states that have been 
rendered increasingly peripheral to Europe’s core, however, appear to 
have lost that immunity due to the threat that their adjudged fiscal 
recklessness has generated for the centers of European capitalism. 
The IMF’s conditional loan policy has made its way up the food chain 
from the Third World nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia via 
the Second World space in Eastern Europe now to the fringes of the 
European Union. The end result for the Third World is that it is left 
burdened with the debt imposed on it previously and neglected by the 
IMF in a time of global economic crisis. 
Although caused primarily by the sort of unsustainable neoliberal 
policies often administered under the guise of emergency that have 
privileged market interests over public interest, and global finance 
over the real economy, the response to the post-2008 economic crisis 
has been more emergency measures to bolster the international 
financial sector. U.N. estimates put the level of funding committed to 
restoring the operations of global finance by 2010 at almost ten times 
that devoted to the fiscal stimulus and social protection programs that 
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are fundamental to rescuing the real economy and preserving basic 
living standards.106 Having appeared to be drifting towards 
irrelevance beforehand, the IMF has been empowered as the chief 
lending institution for countries afflicted by the debt crisis. Virtually 
all assistance given by the IMF has come in the form of further debt-
creating instruments rather than grants to those in most dire straits, 
with the provision of funds continuing to be conditional upon 
prescribed budgetary policies.107 Further, even in the early period of 
the crisis in 2008–2009 (i.e., before the bailout of Greece was on the 
table) the IMF had diverted its attention from the lowest-income 
countries in Africa and Asia to the opportunities in non-EU Europe 
and elsewhere: “by November 2009, 18 countries had drawn on 
emergency financing through standby programs of the IMF, totaling 
some $53 billion, of which about $25 billion was allocated to Iceland 
and countries in Eastern and Central Europe, $18 billion to economies 
in transition and only $10 billion to developing countries.”108 
IV 
STATES OF EMERGENCY AND THE PROTECTION OF CAPITAL 
The prevalent international capitalist system (whose structural 
evolution has itself facilitated the expansion of emergency economic 
power) is marked by a diffusion of power from the once all-powerful 
state to corporations vested with significant control over global 
capital and resources. In one sense, we can see the current situation as 
having revolved full circle from the hegemony of the Dutch and 
British East Indies companies; the physical trading of spices and 
textiles merely substituted by the virtual trading of financial products. 
Significantly, the somewhat unruly apparatus of contemporary global 
capitalism, despite a decentered and deterritorializing character, 
nonetheless relies on the police and security forces of nation-states to 
uphold its logic and protect its performers. Law, including emergency 
powers, and legal discourse intersect with the operations of 
transnational corporations and the assemblies of international trade 
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organizations in significant ways. Without attempting to detail such 
intersections exhaustively, a number of examples can be touched 
upon for illustration. 
A.  Suppression of Resistance to Globalization 
The aforementioned volume on The Political Economy of Law 
begins with excerpts from the judgments of the Ocean Island cases.109 
The small Pacific island in question was established as a British 
settlement after the discovery of phosphate there in 1900, and was 
promptly “denuded of its valuable phosphates and converted into an 
uninhabitable honeycomb of pinnacles, pits, and refuse piles during 
mining operations under British colonial supervision.”110 The story 
unfolds with an all too familiar gist: the circumvention of regulations 
protecting native land interests, the sale of exploitation rights to 
mining companies, the degradation of the native environment by 
those companies in disregard of the terms of their access, and an 
absence of accountability. In the 1970s, the displaced inhabitants of 
the land in question—the Banabans—brought a claim before the 
Chancery Division of the High Court in London against the Crown 
and three British Phosphate Commissioners, seeking payment of 
royalties owed to them by the mining companies as well as restoration 
of the land to a condition suitable for their return. The ensuing 
judgment111 rejected the Banabans’ argument that the Crown owed 
them a fiduciary duty (holding the parties formally equal in law 
without regard to the profound imbalance in their respective political 
and economic power), denied the claim for specific performance in 
terms of restoration of the land and awarded damages according to 
English law rather than Banaban rules or principles, taking no account 
of the social and environmental destruction wrought. The damages 
were based solely on the reduced value of the land as a marketable 
commodity; the court equated “restoration” with “replanting” and the 
mining companies were thus ordered only to re-establish the land’s 
previous vegetation levels by replanting some coconut palms, but not 
to reverse the major upheaval visited on the topography of the land, or 
to replenish the depleted soil. Sally Engle Merry’s conclusion is an 
unavoidable one—the case signifies a lamentable general theme: the 
expansion of European and U.S. capital, in concert with colonial rule, 
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has all too often determined the patterns of economic development 
and social transformation of the Third World.112 
As the exploitation of Third World resources by multinational 
corporations continues today, so too does the use of law to facilitate 
such exploitation. Mimicking the policies of European colonizers, 
post-colonial states have turned to emergency laws and powers in 
order to protect the interest of foreign companies in the face of 
resistance from their own citizens. 
The use of emergency measures to criminalize social protest and 
resistance to major extractive industry projects in Latin America is a 
case in point, where civil society organizations have emphasized the 
use of law as a form of harassment in concert with a strategy of 
increased militarization: 
By maintaining overly vague definitions of concepts such as 
“hostile groups” or criteria for states of emergency, military forces 
are able to mobilise in response to protest actions that normally 
would not justify domestic military deployment. This is the case in 
for example Peru, Ecuador, Mexico and Guatemala.113 
In this context, Ecuador declared a state of emergency on seventy-
seven separate occasions between 2000 and 2006,114 including in 
response to indigenous protests against oil production in the 
Amazonian provinces of Sucumbios and Orellana.115 In Bolivia, the 
Cochabamba “water war” in 1999 (arising from protests against the 
granting of a concession contract for water services to a private 
consortium) prompted the government to declare a nation-wide state 
of emergency.116 A state of exception was likewise declared in 
Guatemala in 2008 to suppress protests against the activities of 
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mining companies. A fifteen-day military occupation of the affected 
area ensued pursuant to the emergency framework, during which the 
behavior of the armed forces prompted the submission by local 
communities of multiple complaints of abuse.117 In Colombia, such 
exceptional situations have been normalized in areas where extractive 
industries operate, with a permanent military presence often 
established to facilitate foreign mining companies and curb local 
resistance.118 In northern Peru, a state of emergency was declared by 
President Ollanta Humala in December 2011 to suppress local 
protests against the construction of an opencast gold and copper mine 
by the U.S.-based Newmont Mining Corporation, in what would be 
the largest foreign investment project in Peru’s history.119 Residents 
of the Cajamarca region are opposed to the project for fear of 
environmental pollution and degradation of the water supply. 
The list can continue but the common denominator is clear: the 
harnessing of the state of emergency as an instrument of exclusion, to 
delegitimize popular protest against potentially harmful and 
exploitative extraction of natural resources and to circumvent the 
participation of local and indigenous communities in the resource 
utilization process. 
In addition to oiling the gears of resource exploitation for the 
purposes of global capitalist consumption, states of emergency have 
also been invoked in attempts to forestall opposition to the free trade 
paradigm and neoliberal globalization. This can be seen in a 
panorama that stretches from rural communities in the Third World, 
where free trade agreements carry an inherent threat to the livelihoods 
of small-scale farmers, to large cities in the West where international 
trade summits convene. 
An indigenous uprising in Ecuador in 2006 in defiance of the 
government’s negotiation of a free trade agreement with the United 
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States and the operation of American petroleum companies prompted 
the declaration of an emergency in five provinces and the resort to 
special powers by Ecuadorian authorities. In numerous African and 
Latin American countries, burdensome structural adjustment 
programs implemented at the behest of the International Monetary 
Fund have triggered “IMF riots”120 and precipitated the use of 
exceptional police powers. 
Western cities and seats of power hosting major world trade 
summits have also found themselves on the fault lines of “anti-
globalization” protests and resorted to the emergency caveat to justify 
heavy-handed suppression of such protest, perhaps most famously in 
the form of the declaration of a state of emergency in Seattle during 
the 1999 ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization.121 
Indeed, as Mark Neocleous observes, “[w]orld summits invariably 
require the declaration of a state of emergency before they have even 
begun”; by way of example, he cites the declaration of a state of 
emergency in parts of the U.S. state of Georgia in 2004, a full two 
weeks in advance of the G8 summit on Sea Island.122 Such a course of 
action indicates the presumption of a security threat emanating from 
the mere existence of individuals and groups with a desire to voice 
opposition and alternatives to prevailing economic structures. 
Advance invocations of special powers also amount to a form of auto-
emergency which exemplifies how ingrained the state of emergency 
now is in the establishment psyche. 
In terms of the convergence of political economy and security 
discourse, the characterization of the “Occupy” movement as a 
“terrorist/extremist” group by City of London police123 is testament to 
ruling class perceptions of any questioning of finance capitalism in its 
current guise as a national security issue. The drastic emergency law 
passed in a bid to suppress anti-austerity student protests in Quebec in 
the spring of 2012,124 and the blanket ban on assembly and 
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demonstration enforced in Frankfurt (and upheld by Germany’s 
Federal Constitutional Court) imposed on the attempted “Blockupy” 
protests at the European Central Bank in May 2012125 are further 
cases in point. 
B.  Security Exceptions in International Trade and Investment Law 
The coalescence of national security-inspired emergency discourse 
and international economic law is visible in the exception clauses of 
bilateral investment treaties, as well as international trade agreements 
such as the World Trade Organization agreements (including the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)) and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. In the trade sphere, the language 
used to justify exceptional measures is often seen as “broad, self-
judging, and ambiguous.”126 Provisions recognizing exceptions to the 
treaties of which they form part (Article XXI of the GATT,127 for 
instance) allow exceptional economic measures to be taken in the 
context of threats to security. That a wide margin of appreciation is 
granted to states in such cases has been indirectly confirmed by the 
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua128 and Oil Platforms129 
cases, prompting considerations of whether Article XXI permits 
“anything under the sun.”130 Elastic interpretations of security in the 
realm of international trade have shown that national security is 
integral, rather than tangential, to ostensibly civilian functions of the 
economy. National security has been invoked, for example, to justify 
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such measures as restrictions on the import of Polish clothes pegs, on 
grounds that domestic peg-producing functions would be necessary in 
the event of an outbreak of hostilities with eastern bloc states.131 
Such banal—by comparison to actions prompted by perceived 
ticking bombs and guerrilla insurrections—security paradigms also 
come to the fore in the context of emergency exceptions in bilateral 
investment treaty law132 and the state of necessity, the guise in which 
the doctrine of emergency crystallizes in customary international law. 
Arbitration proceedings arising from the state of emergency declared 
during Argentina’s fiscal crisis of 1999-2002,133 a paradigmatic 
“economic emergency,” are a case in point. A host of claims have 
been made before the World Bank-affiliated International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) by international investors 
against the Argentine state. Such claims are based on losses incurred 
due to Argentina’s actions during the emergency, which adversely 
affected foreign investors (particularly those invested in the public 
utilities and energy sectors) and included a sovereign debt default of 
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$155 billion,134 the freezing of foreign assets, bank deposits and tariff 
rates, restrictions on withdrawals and transfers, and a significant 
currency devaluation. Argentina has sought to rely upon a defense of 
necessity, claiming the extant state of emergency justified derogation 
from legal obligations to foreign investors. Most relevant to such 
claims given the domicile of the majority of plaintiffs is the 1994 
Argentina–United States Bilateral Investment Treaty, Article XI of 
which holds that the treaty will not “preclude the application by either 
Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order . . . 
or the Protection of its own essential security interests.”135 Argentina 
in its defense also cites the state of necessity exemption from 
international obligations under customary international law. Article 
25 of the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts allows, under strict 
conditions, for the vindication of an internationally wrongful act 
where the act is necessary “to safeguard an essential interest against a 
grave and imminent peril.”136 
The Argentinean claim that the economic measures taken during 
the state’s financial crisis were essential to public order and security 
reinforces the idea of an indivisibility of economy and security. The 
five most significant arbitration tribunal awards to date in this 
regard137 reveal an indeterminacy and inconsistency of law that raise 
questions as to the suitability of applying the concept of emergency 
derogations in financial crises, and to the legitimacy of ICSID 
arbitration itself. Deviations between ICSID tribunals (involving the 
application of different bodies of law; the drawing of diametrically 
opposed conclusions on pivotal matters of both fact and law; and the 
awarding of vastly different amounts of damages) are embodied in the 
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136 Responsibility of States of Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001, 2001 Y.B. Int’l L. 
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137 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award 
(May 12, 2005); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
Award (Oct. 3, 2006); Enron Corp. Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007); Sempra Energy Int’l v Arg. Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 2007); and, Cont’l Cas. Co. v Arg. Republic, ICSID 
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Kathryn Khamsi, Compensation for Non-expropriatory Investment Treaty Breaches in the 
Argentine Gas Sector Cases: Issues and Implications, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 
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2012] The Political Economy of States of Emergency 119 
deeply fractured approaches of the first two tribunals dealing with the 
Argentine crisis—CMS and LG&E—to the question of necessity, on 
virtually identical facts.138 The CMS tribunal held in 2005 that 
Argentina’s actions were not justified by a state of necessity under the 
meaning of international law, and thus ordered a payment of $133 
million to CMS Gas by way of compensation. The following year, the 
LG&E tribunal found the same economic conditions in Argentina to 
be sufficiently grave as to justify emergency measures and reliance on 
a state of necessity, and accordingly awarded a much lower sum 
against the state. 
Of the two, the CMS finding was the one that initially held sway, 
followed in 2007 in both the Enron and Sempra cases, where it was 
held that the situation in Argentina did not compromise “the very 
existence of the State and its independence . . .”139 in the sense of 
Article 25 of the ILC Articles, and as such that Argentina could not 
claim necessity for its emergency measures. The tribunal decisions of 
CMS, Enron and Sempra thus appear to reveal a structural bias that 
permeates investment arbitration law and operates to protect Western 
investment interests in the global South. 
The 2008 Tribunal decision in Continental, on the contrary, 
absolved Argentina’s economic policy as “necessary” to protect 
“essential security interests” under Article XI of the bilateral 
investment treaty and thus awarded the U.S. investor only $2.8 
million of the $112 million claimed. From this and Annulment 
Committee decisions in CMS, Enron and Sempra140 criticizing the 
original tribunal findings on necessity, an emerging pattern may be 
discerned. Although state action is not unfettered in the sense of the 
apparently self-judging standard written into Article XXI of GATT, 
the ICSID proceedings have gradually allowed a wider margin of 
appreciation to the state in the context of Article XI of the Argentina–
United States Bilateral Investment Treaty. A two-tiered approach has 
evolved, whereby emergency-based derogations from obligations may 
be permitted under the Article XI security exception even where the 
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higher threshold of absolute necessity under customary international 
law and Article 25 of the ILC Articles cannot be proved.141 The 
parameters of emergency or necessity under international investment 
law are thus wide enough to include economic instability; not 
restricted to a grave and imminent peril to the existence and 
independence of the state. An economic crisis is thus conflated with a 
threat to security or public order, giving legal truth to Foucault’s 
assertions on the economic as an apparatus of security. 
The apparent emerging pattern in ICSID jurisprudence on the 
Argentine economic emergency suggests the possibility of investment 
dispute resolution as a site of resistance for Third World states. 
Necessity can be an important shield for unstable Third World 
economies as part of the trade-off involved in assuming obligations 
under bilateral investment treaties. While the fundamental purpose of 
protection of global capital still prevails, a certain responsiveness to 
the interests of defendant states can be detected in the recent 
evolution of investment dispute settlement mechanisms (not least with 
Western states attempting to reclaim the higher ground in state-
investor legal relations given the likelihood of international arbitration 
on “emergency” measures undertaken by governments in 2008 and 
thereafter). However, such development of international investment 
law in broad terms remains dominated by the agenda of developed 
states in a manner that eludes particular Third World influence.142 
Whilst any increased sensitivity to state positions generally cannot but 
contain the potential to benefit all states, Ibironke Odumosu shows 
that although international investment law is not being reformulated 
solely to protect foreign investment in the Third World (as was the 
case during the colonial and initial decolonization periods), “it still 
remains largely insulated from Third World sensibilities, and does not 
necessarily take Third World struggles, resistances and perspectives 
into account.”143 
 
141 Notably, however, the Enron Annulment Committee decision found that even the 
higher standard of the customary international law defence of necessity was met in the 
case of Argentina’s economic emergency. 
142 For an interesting exploration of the dwindling of Third World critiques of 
investment arbitration during the 1980s and 1990s, see Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and 
the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 419 (2000). On questions on regime bias and conflict between Western 
and Third World interests in international arbitration, based on the institutional make-up 
and final award decision of the International Chamber of Commerce arbitration tribunal 
regarding the Dabhol project in India, see Gus Van Harten, TWAIL and the Dabhol 
Arbitration, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 131 (2011). 
143 Odumosu, supra note 116, at 257. 
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The Argentine emergency cases are symptomatic of this broader 
point. Among the technologies of exclusion embedded in ICSID 
arbitration is the construction of the state as an abstract, artificial 
entity, divorced from its population.144 The parties to arbitration 
proceedings are generally construed narrowly as the corporate foreign 
investor and the host state as private entities, with the arbitration itself 
framed as a commercial matter. Public interest considerations and the 
needs and desires of the people are incidental. This is the natural 
product of a tendency to subsume individual and community interests 
and social life under the universalizing agent of the nation-state. In 
the Third World in particular, the concerns of the populace are 
homogenized and instrumentalized by the indicators of the economic 
development of the post-colonial state. Thus, when invoked, 
Argentina’s necessity defense is presented primarily through the 
prism of the health of the state’s financial system and institutions, 
rather than the socio-economic conditions or civil rights of its people. 
Popular protests and interests remain sidelined by investment dispute 
settlement mechanisms, with this implicit reading of the state as 
separate from the people it represents allowing a more straightforward 
process that elides consideration of the public interest and the broader 
socio-political elements underlying more purely “legal” questions. As 
such, the state “is stripped of its population with all its appendices—
the public interest, dissenting voices, and needs that do not equate 
with global capitalist ideology—and is left with a not-so-abstract but 
artificial construct, known as government and territory.”145 
Where a wide margin of appreciation is given to the state in respect 
of necessity, as in the recent Argentine ICSID cases, this may help to 
protect Third World state interests, but conversely lays down a 
negative precedent for individual and collective claims by those 
whose rights may be violated in the course of the emergency. The 
application of the margin of appreciation doctrine—granting wide 
latitude to states regarding measures taken in a state of emergency 
and, even more, regarding the existence of the emergency itself—
already comes at the expense of human rights, even within the 
confines of the international system for the protection of human 
rights.146 Investment arbitration is a mechanism of the international 
legal system that is designed to balance the priorities of foreign 
 
144 Id. at 257. 
145 Id. at 270. 
146 See, e.g., Brannigan & McBride v. the United Kingdom, 14553/89, 14554/89, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. judgment 25 May 1993. 
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investors with the interests of the state, devoid of any human rights 
mandate. From the perspective of subaltern populations, the 
appropriateness or usefulness of such a mechanism interpreting or 
making law on the contentious issue of the state of emergency must 
be questioned. Here, anxieties over the fragmentation of international 
law in broad terms can be related to the haphazard international 
governance of states of emergency.147 In this schematic, in a case such 
as Argentina, disregard of state obligations in the socio-economic 
sphere or derogations from individual civil rights under the self-
declared emergency may be accepted as necessary by an international 
or regional human rights body, while at the same time a mechanism 
of international investment law may hold that the same circumstances 
do not constitute an exceptional justification to negate the interests of 
foreign investors. The result is a distorted three-tiered hierarchy that 
privileges the corporation over the state, and the state over the human. 
Apparently evolving ICSID jurisprudence in respect of Argentina 
notwithstanding, the underlying law itself remains vague, and its 
overall application plagued by indeterminacy. While Annulment 
Committee decisions in CMS, Enron and Sempra may have reversed 
the legal reasoning of the original Tribunal decisions, those 
Committees do not serve as appellate bodies in the true sense: they 
cannot overturn the award decisions themselves, nor reduce the 
amounts awarded. Argentina accordingly remains obliged to pay the 
original awards, but has yet do so and is unlikely to do so voluntarily 
in light of the Annulment Committee decisions. Meanwhile, 
impervious to, or ignorant of, the security necessity exception and 
relevant ICSID developments, those in financial circles continue to 
assert the absolute protection of investors under bilateral investment 
treaties, claiming there is a “strong case to be made for liability of 
states under international investment law, a case bolstered by the 
critical absence of exceptions for state conduct in this area of 
international law.”148 
C.  Capitalism’s Emergency: Financial Crises in the Core 
Restrictive international economic measures that have long been 
imposed on developing nations found their way to the European 
 
147 See Vik Kanwar, International Emergency Governance: Fragments of a Driverless 
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Union in 2010. In the midst of a sovereign debt proliferation triggered 
by the vacillations of finance capitalism, Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal were compelled to draw from an emergency “bailout” loan 
facility established by the European Commission, European Central 
Bank and International Monetary Fund troika. The principal 
beneficiaries of this arrangement are the hawkish European Central 
Bank and the financial institutions holding the bonds of the peripheral 
nations’ sovereign and banking debts.149 The brunt of the “austerity” 
measures upon which the loans are conditional is disproportionately 
visited upon subaltern groups in the societies in question.150 Left with 
little effective control over economic policy, Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal have essentially fallen under external dominion in the way 
that Third World nations remain subject to neocolonial dominance 
through prohibitive trade policies and conditional development 
assistance measures that serve to reinforce indebtedness. Ireland has 
heard the reverberations of recolonization, with the troika commonly 
likened to former British landlords and colonial administrators.151 
The dual aims of the EU and the ECB as they have stumbled 
through the economic downturn since 2008 have been to restrict the 
crisis to Europe’s periphery, and to placate the international financial 
markets so as to prevent contagion spreading to its core. Clear 
deference to the structures and institutions of finance capitalism has 
 
149 Here, the absurdity of projecting nationality onto financial transactions in a 
globalized context must be noted. This point is particularly salient with regards a European 
Union in which economic and fiscal policy is increasingly concentrated in a central core, 
and which has been pushing the idea of a single European market for financial services 
since its inception. The removal of borders and nationality of capital is paramount. Money 
can move uninhibited from a German investor in Frankfurt to an English property 
speculator in London, via the books of a bank in Dublin. When things go wrong—and only 
when things go wrong—with the speculative investment, it becomes naturalized as “Irish” 
money; its payback now the responsibility of the Irish people. In a “post-national” 
economic climate where approximately US $4 trillion is traded daily on foreign exchange 
markets alone, such sudden acquisition of “nationality” by free-moving money can only be 
seen as the “crudest form of nationalism.” See Fintan O’Toole, Treatment of Ireland a 
Disaster for European Project, THE IRISH TIMES (May 3, 2011), http://www.irishtimes 
.com/newspaper/opinion/2011/0503/1224295913381.html. 
150 In Ireland, for example, one of the cruelly ironic results of the disproportionate 
diversion of public funds to service private debt amidst a climate of increasing poverty has 
been the dismantling of the Combat Poverty Agency, the only state agency specifically 
dedicated to poverty alleviation. 
151 Those viewing the situation from a Third World perspective and conscious of the 
IMF’s role in Africa in particular will detect an irony in the fact that the IMF has been the 
least hawkish of the troika in its European policy; maintaining (if not imposing on its 
European partners) a pragmatic awareness that it is not in the interests of the international 
economy to cripple domestic economies entirely through debt and austerity. 
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been shown by Europe’s technocratic establishment, justified with 
reference to the necessity of preserving the extant system for fear of 
what might prevail were it to collapse. Greece, Ireland, and Portugal 
were effectively forced into austerity and structural adjustment 
programs, as well as further debt, in order to repay and reassure 
private bondholders, and, through such vivid demonstration of the 
severity of European emergency rescue measures, to spur larger euro-
zone states into addressing their own debt problems. With the Italian 
and Spanish dominoes wobbling significantly, power in terms of 
European economic governance is concentrated in an ever-shrinking 
core, centered on a Franco-German axis.  The protection of German 
and French banks is held up as sacrosanct; one cannot but be 
reminded of Lenin’s critique of finance capitalism almost a century 
ago, indicting the excessive concentration of capital and power in 
French and German banks.152 The result of the crisis is the increasing 
fracture and fragmentation of the European Union. The people of 
irresponsible basket-case peripheral states153 are held responsible for 
the reckless lending of private institutions and the poor governance of 
public institutions, while the political and economic powers at the 
core remain immune from accountability for their own questionable 
lending and governance practices. 
Emergency authority operates as a flexible response mechanism for 
grappling with the exposure of modern capitalism to periodic crisis. 
The troika’s management of the crisis emerges as a form of 
international intervention couched in technocratic procedures that 
often disregard normal constitutional arrangements. The 
establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility to provide 
financial assistance to struggling member states stood in stark conflict 
with the “no bailout clause” contained in Article 125 of the (Rome) 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It is permitted, 
however, by Article 122 of that treaty, which allows for the 
conditional granting of financial assistance where a member state is 
“seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural 
disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control.” In so doing, 
the EU has for all intents and purposes declared itself in a state of 
 
152 LENIN, supra note 11, at 31–46. 
153 Culturally condescending attitudes and rhetoric—particularly in relation to Greece, 
instrumentalized by their northern European counterparts as lazy, nefarious and incapable 
of good governance and basic accounting—have been a hallmark of the euro-zone crisis. 
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emergency, invoking a paradigm of exception that has underpinned, 
but has not been restricted to, the institutional bailouts of Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal. Larger debt-ridden economies such as Italy and 
Spain have become increasingly reliant on “emergency intervention” 
by the European Central Bank,154 subject accordingly to budgetary 
supervision, and obliged to plunge down the avenue of austerity. 
European leaders stumbled from one “emergency” summit to the 
next, reaching the sixteenth such meeting since the outbreak of the 
crisis by the end of 2011.155 Continuing failures to resolve the 
situation had precipitated German calls in the run-up to that summit 
for an “emergency, narrow treaty change” (to Article 126 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which regulates the 
economic policy of member states in respect of budget deficits) in 
order to grant the European Court of Justice the power to impose 
sanctions on indebted nations that fail to execute the necessary 
budgetary adjustments.156 A strong institutional advocate of what 
might be described as increased governmentality of the European 
polity, the European Commission sought to further capitalize on the 
euro-zone crisis by pushing reforms that would allow weaker states to 
be placed under “a form of EU ‘administration,’”157 effectively 
rendering any such state a protectorate of the Brussels bureaucratic 
apparatus. 
Increased budgetary supervision and centralized economic 
governance was indeed agreed upon at the December 2011 emergency 
summit, where euro-zone leaders explicitly invoked the terminology 
of their own “new deal.”158 The general immunity of capitalist 
institutions from accountability was further extended, however. The 
German chancellor abandoned her prior insistence that private 
financial institutions assume a share of the financial burden of debt 
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servicing across Europe. Britain prioritized the financiers of the City 
of London over the stabilization of the European economy, opting out 
of the agreement upon failing to secure the City of London as a zone 
of exception from any heightened financial regulation. In the ensuing 
treaty agreed by twenty-five of the EU’s member states in January 
2012,159 the elevation of finance sector interests is clear. Centralized 
fiscal controls are institutionalized; fiscal rectitude is to be enforced 
through quintessential international monetary conditionality 
arrangements. The treaty is not signed by all EU member states and as 
such cannot be an instrument of EU law, yet stakes an explicit claim 
for its substance to be incorporated into the legal framework of the 
European Union legal framework within five years of its entry into 
force. It also delegates signatory states’ prerogatives to the European 
Commission and European Court of Justice—similarly outside the 
“normal” legal parameters of the EU—and without reference to any 
exceptional circumstances, but permanently. In this light, the treaty is 
seen as a utilitarian “use of the state of emergency in a way that is 
contrary to the democratic construction of the EU and functional to 
respond to the pressure of the markets.”160 The path being followed 
illuminates the EU as a form of commissarial dictatorship, beholden 
to the market rather than to the principles of democracy, in which 
technocracy trumps politics and the structures of European 
governance are revolutionized from Brussels and Frankfurt under the 
guise of the necessity of preserving the single currency. 
The troika’s second bailout package for Greece, agreed in February 
2012, speaks further to the primacy of soft power technocracy to that 
end. Amidst the rhetoric of a monetary crisis inching ever closer to 
the precipice, Greece’s economic management becomes subject to 
“enhanced and permanent . . . on-site monitoring” by European 
experts.161 The country is required to amend its constitution to 
prioritize debt repayments over the funding of government services, 
while the “bold structural reform agenda” imposed on the labor 
market162 involves deep cuts to salaries, pensions and the minimum 
wage. With a confidential document circulated among euro-zone 
finance ministers in advance of the bailout negotiations having 
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warned that such medicine would be unlikely to cure Greece’s ails,163 
questions arise as to the ideological motivations for pursuing this 
particular form of labor-targeting austerity, regardless of the 
warnings. 
The discourse of emergency has also permeated domestic 
lawmaking, justifying the socialization of private debt by national 
governments and the fast tracking of emergency finance measures 
through the legislative process. In the United States, the reaction to 
the ailing finance sector was the passing of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act in 2008. In Ireland, the Credit Institutions (Financial 
Support) Act 2008, commonly referred to as an “emergency law” (the 
absence of a formal state of emergency notwithstanding),164 was 
enacted to guarantee the liabilities of all banks in the state, including 
the particularly “toxic” debt held by speculative commercial lenders 
Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide. A few months later, the 
emergency nationalization of the former was fast-tracked by the 
Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Act 2009.165 The Credit Institutions 
(Stabilisation) Act 2010, introducing radical reforms to the banking 
sector and granting sweeping emergency powers to the Minister for 
Finance, was similarly rushed through both houses of parliament in a 
single day. For perspective, the Emergency Powers Act 1976—
introducing special police powers in response to the intensification of 
violence by the provisional IRA, arguably a more time-sensitive 
matter166—was the subject of weeks of debate and deliberation by 
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both houses, and a Supreme Court assessment of its constitutionality 
before being passed into law. Arriving into government in early 2011 
on a wave of self-proclaimed “democratic revolution,” the first 
gesture of the Fine Gael/Labour coalition was to echo the vernacular 
that had accompanied previous war-time emergency powers 
legislation. Its program for government thus spoke of an 
“unprecedented national economic emergency” necessitating “strong, 
resolute leadership.”167 
The reality is that the protection of the financial sector rather than 
the real economy signifies undue deference to capitalist institutions 
and obfuscates the notion of the common good by reifying elitist 
misappropriations of the “commons.” This obfuscation of the 
common good is starkly revealed in the 1% - 99% dichotomy that 
emerged as central to the narrative of the “Occupy” movement. In 
global terms, the hegemonic biases of the international economic 
system are also very much in evidence. Most Third World countries 
are less integrated into the international financial sector, whose crisis 
has most severely impacted the West, while it has been the spillover 
effect of that financial crisis on global trade and the real economy that 
has hit the Third World hardest. The priority in the response of 
Western policymakers has clearly been given to rescuing the finance 
sector rather than stimulating the real economy; restoring the status 
quo rather than radically overhauling the financial system to prevent 
another collapse. As far as the institutions are concerned, the IMF for 
its part can be seen as having somewhat neglected its commitment to 
Third World development now that more lucrative prey has emerged 
on the peripheries of Europe. 
V 
CONCLUSION: PERMANENT ECONOMIC EMERGENCY AND THE 
“REAL” STATE OF EMERGENCY 
Historical analysis shows that the use of emergency measures to 
manage the economy is pervasive, and can eclipse differences of 
ideology and legal landscape. Civil and common law systems, 
colonial and post-colonial regimes, right-wing and left-wing 
administrations; all have been wont to resort to states of emergency in 
the economic sphere, in some shape or form. The overriding and 
inescapable conclusion, however, is the centrality of emergency to the 
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entrenchment of capitalist doctrine and institutions in modern political 
life. As such, emergency economic regulation is the normal and 
permanent state of affairs in the contemporary state. It is defined in 
ongoing political time, standing in stark contrast to the urgent, 
exceptional, immediate moment of the “ticking bomb” scenario so 
often invoked as the paradigmatic state of exception. Bearing in mind 
the differentiation between the state itself and government as but one 
of several elements of the state system, it is unsurprising that coercive 
state functions tend to become embedded in the machinery of state 
power in a manner that renders them distinct from government. Thus 
such repressive functions survive and transcend changes of 
administration. The overarching function of the elite interests that 
control this machinery is to preserve and consolidate capitalist 
interests in a class-structured society.168 Understanding the state of 
emergency as part of this machinery allows us to diagnose the 
permanent nature of the emergency. 
Reflecting on the permanent nature of the ongoing economic crisis 
in Europe, Slavoj Žižek implores us to remember that 
[W]e are dealing with political economy—that there is nothing 
‘natural’ in such a crisis, that the existing global economic system 
relies on a series of political decisions—while simultaneously being 
fully aware that, insofar as we remain within the capitalist system, 
the violation of its rules effectively causes economic breakdown, 
since the system obeys a pseudo-natural logic of its own. So, 
although we are clearly entering a new phase of enhanced 
exploitation, rendered easier by the conditions of the global market 
(outsourcing, etc.), we should also bear in mind that this is imposed 
by the functioning of the system itself, always on the brink of 
financial collapse.169 
Here, Žižek is responding to mainstream establishment narratives that 
portray economic crises as naturally occurring events; emergency 
regulation is in turn presented not as political decision but as the 
imperative of an apolitical financial logic. The “no alternative” 
mantra predominates. Thus, the IMF, long seen as an “oppressive 
agent of global capital” from a Third World perspective, appears from 
another perspective as a “neutral agent of discipline and order.”170 
The lessons from the Third World experience of vicious debt cycles 
are disregarded. 
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The cyclical and increasingly destabilized nature of advanced 
capitalism suggests that as long as the system is maintained in its 
present form, economic crises will reoccur and emergency measures 
that prejudice subaltern and Third World populations will continue to 
be necessary to preserve the structures and institutions of global 
capitalism. Through the lens of a continuing and permanent 
emergency, the norm/emergency divide is exposed as illusory; 
emergency is the norm. The implication that flows is that rather than 
simply demanding a return to “normal” rules of law and economic 
governance, what is needed is a counter politics not only against the 
permanent emergency but also against the normality of class power 
structures and the rule of law that sustains them.171 While Neocleous 
implies that this necessitates a turn to violence, the popular uprisings 
in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 may have brought about the beginnings 
of what Walter Benjamin envisaged as a “real state of emergency”172 
that seeks not legal checks and balances on the permanent emergency 
but an overhaul of the system that fosters it. It is as yet unclear 
whether resistance to the authoritarian status quo in the Arab world 
and to economic structures globally by the likes of the “Indignados” 
and “Occupy” movements can be sustained to garner sufficient 
leverage to effectuate progressive and lasting systemic change. A 
concerted challenge to the discourses of emergency law and 
emergency economic regulation may at the least provide a 
springboard towards the radical transformation of global governance 
structures. 
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